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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

NO. 03-2731

PETER MANTZ,
Appellant
v.
STEVEN SINGER JEWELERS
and STEVEN SINGER

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 01-CV-06351)
District Judge: Hon. Mary A. McLaughlin

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 28, 2004
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, FISHER, and ALARCÓN * , Circuit Judges
(Filed June 3, 2004)

OPINION OF THE COURT
ALARCÓN, Circuit Judge.
Peter Mantz appeals from the final order of the district court denying his petition
for an award of attorney’s fees in the amount of $31,083. Instead, the court awarded a

*

Hon. Arthur L. Alarcón, Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.

total of $17,040 in attorney’s fees and $1,545.99 in costs. Mr. Mantz contends that the
district court erred as a matter of law in failing to award attorney’s fees at his requested
rate of $250 per hour and in calculating the number of hours expended by his counsel in
this matter. He also asserts that the district court erred in failing to hold a hearing to
determine the amount of attorney’s fees that should be awarded. We affirm because we
conclude that the district court applied the correct legal standards and did not abuse its
discretion in its award of attorney’s fees.
I
This action arose out of a dispute between Mr. Mantz and his former employer,
Steven Singer Jewelers, and his boss, Steven Singer (collectively “Singer”), over the
alleged nonpayment of overtime wages, as well as for all of the hours he had worked. On
December 13, 2001, Mr. Mantz filed an action in district court for overtime pay pursuant
to the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FSLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, 216(b). He also filed a
supplemental claim for payment of unpaid wages under the Pennsylvania Wage Payment
and Collection Law, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 260.1, 260.9a.
On August 14, 2002, Mr. Mantz was awarded $25,000 following an arbitration
hearing pursuant to E.D. Pa. Local R. Civ. P. 53.2(3)(A)1 . Mr. Mantz filed an attorney’s

1

Local Rule 53.2(3)(A) provides in pertinent part: “The Clerk of Court shall . . .
designate and process for compulsory arbitration all civil cases . . . wherein money
damages only are being sought in an amount not in excess of $150,000.00 exclusive of
interest and costs.”
2

fees petition on August 28, 2002 pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)2 .
On September 4, 2002, Singer requested a trial de novo in the district court 3 . On
the same day, Singer offered to settle the dispute for a total of $15,000, including an
award for past wages, overtime pay, attorney’s fees and costs. Mr. Mantz rejected the
offer. On October 25, 2002, the district court dismissed without prejudice the petition for
attorney’s fees for the time expended in the arbitration proceedings.
At trial, Mr. Mantz argued that he was entitled to an award of $23,498.43 in
overtime pay and regular wages. The district court found for Mr. Mantz on both claims
and awarded him a total of $5,376 in overtime pay, unpaid regular wages, and liquidated
damages. It also held that Mr. Mantz was entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.
On March 28, 2003, Mr. Mantz filed a petition for $31,083 in attorney’s fees and
$1,545.99 in costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Singer filed its opposition on April 4,
2003. On May 7, 2003, the district court filed an order awarding Mr. Mantz $14,360 in
attorney’s fees and $1,545.99 in costs.
On May 22, 2003, Mr. Mantz filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment in
which he requested an additional award of attorney’s fees for the time expended in the
trial before the district court. On June 3, 2003, the district court amended the judgment
2

Section 216(b) provides as follows, in pertinent part: “The court in such action shall,
in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable
attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.”
3

Local Rule 53.2(7)(A) provides: “Within thirty (30) days after the arbitration award
is entered on the docket, any party may demand a trial de novo in the district court.”
3

and awarded Mr. Mantz an additional $2,680 in attorney’s fees. Mr. Mantz has timely
appealed from the district court’s award of attorney’s fees.
II
Mr. Mantz contends that the district court erred as a matter of law in applying the
appropriate legal standards in determining its award of attorney’s fees. The
reasonableness of a district court’s award of attorney’s fees is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. This court reviews de novo “the standards and procedures applied by the
District Court in determining attorneys’ fees.” Loughner v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 260 F.3d
173, 177 (3d Cir. 2001). This court will disturb findings of fact only if they are clearly
erroneous. Id.
The standards and procedures that must be applied in calculating attorney’s fees
are set forth in Loughner. They can be summarized as follows:
One. “[A] party opposing [a] fee award has the burden to
challenge [the amount requested] ‘by affidavit or brief with
sufficient specificity to give fee applicants notice, the
reasonableness of the requested fee.’” Loughner, 260 F.3d at
178 (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3rd
Cir. 1990)).
Two. A “district court cannot decrease a fee award based on
factors not raised at all by the adverse party.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Three. A district court must articulate the findings that
support its award and set forth its reasons for concluding that
it is reasonable, to provide this court with a basis for review.
Id. at 179. Failure to do so may compel a remand for analysis
and findings. Id.
4

Four. “[I]n calculating the hours reasonably expended, the
District Court should review the time charged, decide whether
the hours set forth were reasonably expended for each of the
particular purposes described and then exclude those that are
excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Id. at 178
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Five. “Generally, a reasonable hourly rate is calculated
according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant
community.” Id. at 180.
Six. In fixing the hourly rate, “[t]he court should assess the
experience and skill of the prevailing party’s attorneys and
compare their rates to the rates prevailing in the community
for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill,
experience, and reputation.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Seven. “The starting point in ascertaining a reasonable hourly
rate is the attorney’s usual billing rate, but this is not
dispositive.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The record shows that Singer and the district court followed each of the standards
and procedures required by this circuit in assessing the reasonableness of a petition for
attorney’s fees. Singer filed a brief specifically challenging the number of hours Mr.
Mantz claims his attorney expended in this matter, and the requested hourly rate. The
district court did not decrease the fee award based on factors not raised by Singer in its
opposition brief, nor did it just accept Singer’s objections. After performing “a line by
line review of the fee request,” the district court set forth its reasons for reducing the
number of hours and the hourly rate claimed by Mr. Mantz’s counsel in a fourteen-page
memorandum and order. It contains sufficient analysis and findings for a meaningful
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review. The court articulated the bases for excluding hours that it determined were
excessive and unnecessary.
In assessing the reasonableness of the hourly rate asserted by Mr. Mantz’s counsel,
the court properly considered counsel’s usual billing rate, the Community Legal Services’
Fees Schedule, its perception of counsel’s skill and experience during the trial of the
underlying matter, as well as the quality of his moving papers. A court may “reduce
requested fees with respect to matters within the judge’s personal knowledge.” Bell v.
United Princeton Props., Inc., 884 F.2d 713, 719 (3rd Cir. 1989).
We conclude that the district court did not err in following the appropriate legal
standards and procedures nor did it abuse its discretion in the total amount of attorney’s
fees awarded to Mr. Mantz.
III
Mr. Mantz maintains that the district court considered improper factors in
determining a reasonable hourly rate for counsel’s services. First, he asserts that the
district court improperly considered the attorney’s fees in proportion to the award he
received for overtime pay and unpaid wages. The court did not compare the amount
awarded to Mr. Mantz and the amount requested for attorney’s fees. The district court
stated:
Given the relative simplicity of this case, its barely successful
outcome when one considers the amount of money sought by
the plaintiff, and Mr. Agre’s skill as observed by this Court at
trial and in the pleadings he has submitted, the Court
6

exercises its discretion to apply an hourly rate of $200 for Mr.
Agre’s work.
The court’s comparison was between the $23,498.43 requested in overtime pay and
unpaid wages and the amount of $5,376 actually awarded as reflecting on counsel’s
questionable skill and experience in assessing the value of his client’s claim.
Mr. Mantz also argues that the district court improperly considered Singer’s Rule
68 offer in reducing attorney’s fees. The record does not support this contention. The
court did not determine that it was unreasonable to continue litigating the case after the
Rule 68 settlement offer was made. The court stated that it decreased the amount of the
requested fees “under the general reasonableness approach.”
IV
Mr. Mantz further maintains that the district court abused its discretion because it
did not hold a hearing to determine how much time his attorney actually expended in
prosecuting the underlying matter. Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
authorizes district courts to decide motions without a hearing: “To expedite its business,
the court may make provision by rule or order for the submission and determination of
motions without oral hearing upon brief written statements of reasons in support and
opposition.” The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has adopted
Local Rule 7.1(f). It provides as follows: “Any interested party may request oral
argument on a motion. The court may require oral argument, whether or not requested by
a party. The court may dispose of a motion without oral argument.” (emphasis added).
7

Mr. Mantz has failed to cite any authority that requires a hearing to review a
petition for attorney’s fees. There is no factual dispute between the parties as to whether
Mr. Mantz’s attorney expended the claimed hours–the dispute is whether the expended
hours were necessary. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr.
Mantz’s motion for an evidentiary hearing on the amount of time expended in this matter.
It reviewed memoranda submitted by Mr. Mantz’s counsel, the several pleadings he filed,
and his performance in court.
We affirm because we hold that the district court applied the correct legal
standards and did not abuse its discretion in determining a reasonable attorney’s fees
award.

